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On inference from non-instantiated properties

Icefield, William (2020) On inference from non-instantiated properties. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Ontological arguments similar to Anslem's ontological argument and Godel's ontological argument implicitly rely on the paradox of entailment and inference from a non-instantiated property. But this is questionable reliance - there is a controversy as to whether one can actually infer from non-instantiated properties. This is more so, given that inference from a non-instantiated property allows us to prove existence of objects or beings that we find questionable. It is then argued that if we are to ban such questionable proofs, we should restrict scope of valid sentences. While we can infer about a non-instantiated property, inference from a non-instantiated property should be disallowed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Icefield, Williamwilliamicefield@gmail.com
Keywords: paradox of entailment, ontological arguments, property instantiation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Depositing User: William Icefield
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2020 15:28
Last Modified: 16 Mar 2020 15:28
Item ID: 17006
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Date: 5 February 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17006

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