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Norms for pure desire

Verdejo, Víctor M. (2020) Norms for pure desire. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (1). pp. 95-112. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel prin- ciples for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Verdejo, Víctor M.vmverdejo@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: desire, belief, rationality, coherence, Hume.
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 05 Mar 2020 01:29
Last Modified: 05 Mar 2020 01:29
Item ID: 16972
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.19624
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
Date: January 2020
Page Range: pp. 95-112
Volume: 35
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16972

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