PhilSci Archive

The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-Causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics

Reutlinger, Alexander and Colyvan, Mark and Krzyzanowska, Karolina (2020) The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-Causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Prospects for Unified Explanation-FINAL.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (284kB) | Preview

Abstract

We explore the prospects of a monist account of explanation for both non-causal explanations in science and pure mathematics. Our starting point is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) for explanations in science, as advocated in the recent literature on explanation. We argue that, despite the obvious differences between mathematical and scientific explanation, the CTE can be extended to cover both non-causal explanations in science and mathematical explanations. In particular, a successful application of the CTE to mathematical explanations requires us to rely on counterpossibles. We conclude that the CTE is a promising candidate for a monist account of explanation in both science and mathematics.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de0000-0001-7638-6059
Colyvan, Markmark.colyvan@sydney.edu.au
Krzyzanowska, Karolinak.h.krzyzanowska@uva.nl0000-0002-6424-8027
Additional Information: forthcoming in Erkenntnis
Keywords: Explanation; non-causal explanation; mathematical explanation; counterfactuals; counter-possibles; impossible worlds; explanatory monism; mathematics; philosophy of mathematics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Explanation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 21 Feb 2020 18:30
Last Modified: 21 Feb 2020 18:30
Item ID: 16933
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Explanation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: 2020
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16933

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item