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Neither Presentism nor Eternalism

ROVELLI, Carlo (2019) Neither Presentism nor Eternalism. Foundations of Physics, 49 (12). pp. 1325-1335. ISSN 0015-9018

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Abstract

Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and becoming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
ROVELLI, Carlorovelli@cpt.univ-mrs.fr0000-0003-1724-9737
Keywords: Special Relativity, Time, McTaggart, Reality of Time
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Depositing User: Carlo ROVELLI
Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2020 19:55
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2020 19:55
Item ID: 16898
Journal or Publication Title: Foundations of Physics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Date: 6 October 2019
Page Range: pp. 1325-1335
Volume: 49
Number: 12
ISSN: 0015-9018
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16898

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