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Semantic Realism in the Semantic Conception of Theories

Ruyant, Quentin (2020) Semantic Realism in the Semantic Conception of Theories. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Semantic realism can be characterised as the idea that scientic theories are truth-bearers, and that they are true or false in virtue of the world. This notion is often assumed, but rarely discussed in the literature. I examine how it fares in the context of the semantic view of theories and in connection with the literature on scientic representation. Making sense of semantic realism requires specifying the conditions of application of theoretical models, even for models that are not actually used, which leads to several diculties. My conclusion is that semantic realism is far more demanding than one would expect. Finally, I briey examine some pragmatist alternatives.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ruyant, Quentinquentin.ruyant@gmail.com
Keywords: Semantic realism Pragmatism Scientific realism Scientific representation Semantic conception of theories
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Mr. Quentin Ruyant
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2020 00:12
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2020 00:12
Item ID: 16859
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: January 2020
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16859

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