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On Representational Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument

Bradley, Clara and Weatherall, James Owen (2019) On Representational Redundancy, Surplus Structure, and the Hole Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We address a recent proposal concerning 'surplus structure' due to Nguyen et al. ['Why Surplus Structure is Not Superfluous.' Br. J. Phi. Sci. Forthcoming.] We argue that the sense of 'surplus structure' captured by their formal criterion is importantly different from---and in a sense, opposite to---another sense of 'surplus structure' used by philosophers. We argue that minimizing structure in one sense is generally incompatible with minimizing structure in the other sense. We then show how these distinctions bear on Nguyen et al.'s arguments about Yang-Mills theory and on the hole argument.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bradley, Claraclarajbradley@gmail.com
Weatherall, James Owenweatherj@uci.edu
Keywords: hole argument, surplus structure, structure, Yang-Mills theory, representational redundancy
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: James Owen Weatherall
Date Deposited: 21 Jan 2020 01:50
Last Modified: 21 Jan 2020 01:50
Item ID: 16837
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16837

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