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The evidential conditional

Vincenzo, Crupi and Andrea, Iacona (2019) The evidential conditional. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of "if... then..." exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material reading of "if... then..." implied by the suppositional theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Vincenzo, Crupivincenzo.crupi@unito.it
Andrea, Iaconaandrea.iacona@unito.it
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
Depositing User: Vincenzo Crupi
Date Deposited: 28 Dec 2019 07:57
Last Modified: 28 Dec 2019 07:57
Item ID: 16757
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Evidence
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16757

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