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The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties

Gozzano, Simone (2018) The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties. Topoi. ISSN 1572-8749

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Abstract

According to non-reductive physicalism, mental properties of the phenomenal sort are essentially different from physical
properties, and cannot be reduced to them. This being a quarrel about properties, I draw on the categorical / dispositional distinction
to discuss this non-reductive claim. Typically, non-reductionism entails a categorical view of phenomenal properties.
Contrary to this, I will argue that phenomenal properties, usually characterized by what it is like to have them, are mainly the
manifestation of dispositional properties. This paper is thus divided into two parts. In the first part, after tracing a working
distinction between categorical and dispositional properties, I argue that there is a form of incoherence looming behind the
idea of taking phenomenal properties as categorical. In the second part, I argue in favor of the view that phenomenal properties
are dispositional properties with an essential manifestation. This interpretation allows us to broaden dispositionalism so
as to include the sciences of mind, thus ultimately favoring a physicalist view on the mind.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gozzano, Simonesimone.gozzano@cc.univaq.it0000-0002-2956-4120
Keywords: Dispositional properties · Categorical properties · Phenomenal properties · Quidditism · Ramseyan humility
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Depositing User: Dr. Simone Gozzano
Date Deposited: 16 Dec 2019 18:28
Last Modified: 16 Dec 2019 18:28
Item ID: 16730
Journal or Publication Title: Topoi
Publisher: Spirnger
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9597-6
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Natural Kinds
Date: 2018
ISSN: 1572-8749
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16730

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