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Classical vs. Bayesian statistics

Johannesson, Eric (2019) Classical vs. Bayesian statistics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they can't. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist isn't allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before, then (in certain situations), either he has to have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with, or fail to update his credences by conditionalization.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Johannesson, Ericjohannesson.eric@gmail.com0000-0001-9128-2565
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Dr. Eric Johannesson
Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2019 03:12
Last Modified: 15 Dec 2019 03:12
Item ID: 16703
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16703

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