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NO KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED

Reuter, Kevin and Broessel, Peter (2018) NO KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED. Episteme, 16 (3). pp. 303-321.

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Abstract

Assertions are the centre of gravity in social epistemology. They are the vehicles we use to exchange information within scientific groups and society as a whole. It is therefore essential to determine under which conditions we are permitted to make an assertion. In this paper we argue and provide empirical evidence for the view that the norm of assertion is justified belief: truth or even knowledge are not required. Our results challenge the knowledge account advocated by, e.g. Williamson (1996), in general, and more specifically, put into question several studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2016) that support a knowledge norm of assertion. Instead, the justified belief account championed by, e.g. Douven (2006), seems to prevail.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reuter, Kevin
Broessel, Peter
Keywords: Norms of Assertion
Depositing User: Dr Peter Brössel
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2019 13:54
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2019 13:54
Item ID: 16526
Journal or Publication Title: Episteme
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.10
DOI or Unique Handle: doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.10
Date: 2018
Page Range: pp. 303-321
Volume: 16
Number: 3
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16526

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