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Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics

Dimitrijević, Dejan R. (2019) Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The argument from causal closure of the physical (CCP) is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the mental forces of a Newtonian nature, i.e. those which manifest themselves by causing accelerations. However, it is conceivable and possible that mental causation is manifested through the redistribution of energy, momentum and other conserved quantities in the system, brought about by altering the state probability distribution within the living system and leading to anomalous correlations of neural processes. After arguing that a probabilistic, interactionist model of mental causation is conceivable, which renders the argument from causal closure of the physical ineffective, I point to some basic features that such a model must have in order to be intelligible. At the same time, I indicate the way that conclusive testing of CCP can be done within the theoretical framework of physics.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dimitrijević, Dejan R.dimke@junis.ni.ac.rs0000-0001-7668-8153
Keywords: Causal closure of the physical; Mental causation; Second law of thermodynamics; Physics; Probability distribution
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Depositing User: Dr. Dejan R. Dimitrijević
Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2019 00:35
Last Modified: 06 Oct 2019 00:35
Item ID: 16496
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16496

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