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Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress

Park, Seungbae (2020) Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress. pp. 173-184.

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Abstract

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Cognitive Episode, Means-End Thesis, Non-Cognitive Episode, Restriction Thesis
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2020 03:53
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2020 03:53
Item ID: 16459
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10838...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09480-8
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: March 2020
Page Range: pp. 173-184
Volume: 51
Number: 1
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16459

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