PhilSci Archive

Adaptive Empiricism

Bacciagaluppi, Guido (2019) Adaptive Empiricism. Lost in Physics and Metaphysics – Questioni di Realismo Scientifico. pp. 99-113.

[img]
Preview
Text
Bacciagaluppi adaptive empiricism - for archive.pdf

Download (362kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper presents a sketch of a moderately anti-realist position in philosophy of science that is a modification of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and that I call ‘adaptive empiricism’. This modification is motivated by the intuition that assessing what is or is not observable should be an important element of theory choice for an empiricist. (I use cases of underdetermination as examples.) Thus I argue that Van Fraassen’s distinction between what is observable and what is unobservable should be adapted to changing theoretical and experimental contexts. I close with some ideas as to how to develop this position more fully.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bacciagaluppi, Guidog.bacciagaluppi@uu.nl
Keywords: empiricism, Van Fraassen, observable-unobservable distinction, phenomena, underdetermination
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Guido Bacciagaluppi
Date Deposited: 31 Aug 2019 22:56
Last Modified: 31 Aug 2019 22:56
Item ID: 16392
Journal or Publication Title: Lost in Physics and Metaphysics – Questioni di Realismo Scientifico
Publisher: Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze e Lettere
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.4081/incontri.2019.465
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 1 January 2019
Page Range: pp. 99-113
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16392

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item