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The Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games

Mohseni, Aydin (2019) The Limitations of Equilibrium Concepts in Evolutionary Games. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In evolutionary games, equilibrium concepts adapted from classical game theory—typically, refinements of the Nash equilibrium—are employed to identify the probable outcomes of evolutionary processes. Over the years, various negative results have been produced demonstrating limitations to each proposed refinement. These negative results rely on an undefined notion of evolutionary significance. We propose an explicit and novel definition of the notion of evolutionary significance in line with what is assumed in these results. This definition enables a comprehensive analysis of the limitations of the proposed equilibrium concepts. Taken together, the results show that even under favorable assumptions as to the underlying dynamics and stability concept—the replicator dynamics and asymptotic stability—all equilibrium concept makes errors of either omission or commission; typically both.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mohseni, Aydin0000-0002-4054-0058
Keywords: Evolutionary Game Theory, Nash equilibrium, equilibrium refinements, evolutionarily stable strategy
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Aydin Mohseni
Date Deposited: 30 Aug 2019 03:51
Last Modified: 30 Aug 2019 03:51
Item ID: 16388
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16388

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