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On Salience and Signalling in Sender-Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points

LaCroix, Travis (2019) On Salience and Signalling in Sender-Receiver Games: Partial Pooling, Learning, and Focal Points. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

I introduce an extension of the Lewis-Skyrms signaling game, analysed from a dynamical perspective via simple reinforcement learning. In David Lewis' (1969) conception of a signaling game, salience is offered as an explanation for how individuals may come to agree upon a linguistic convention. Brian Skyrms (2010) offers a dynamic explanation of how signaling conventions might arise presupposing no salience whatsoever. The extension of the atomic signaling game examined here—which I will refer to as a salience game—introduces a variable parameter into the atomic signaling game which allows for degrees of salience, thus filling in the continuum between Skyrms' and Lewis' models. The model does not presuppose any salience at the outset, but illustrates a process by which accidentally evolved salience is amplified, to the benefit of the players. It is shown that increasing degrees of salience allow populations to avoid sub-optimal pooling equilibria and to coordinate upon conventions more quickly.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
LaCroix, Travistlacroix@uci.edu0000-0002-1724-3434
Keywords: Signaling Games; Salience and Focal Points; Communication Conventions
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Dr. Travis LaCroix
Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2019 01:02
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2019 01:02
Item ID: 16270
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1766-z
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 13 March 2019
ISSN: 1573-0964
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16270

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