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The Mechanical View

Morett, Fernando (2019) The Mechanical View. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I introduce and characterise the Mechanical view as a third view on scientific theories besides the Syntactic and the Semantic views. Currently, there is no such term and category which unifies the work philosophers of science such as Norman Campbell, Mary Hesse, Rom Harré, Nancy Cartwright, and Ronald Giere. Currently the work of these and other related philosophers is either placed as part of the Semantic view, or it remains an orphan with no family and no generic name or characterisation. Each philosopher is therefore treated separately, or is regarded as unrelated or weakly related to others. The introduction of the Mechanical view as a comprehensive position within the philosophy of science has at least three advantages: First, it unifies apparently dissimilar and unrelated positions economising and enhancing both analysis and understanding as well as helping the reappraisal of the work done by forerunners. Second, it helps to correct the wrong characterisation of the work from philosophers like Ronald Giere, whose work is placed as part of the Semantic view. Third, along with the Syntactic and the Semantic views, the Mechanical view exhausts virtually all philosophical research done on models, and in other areas in the philosophy of science. A unified characterisation can bring benefits to the Mechanical view itself, by systematising and empowering its own view and future research.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Morett, Fernandof.morett@xanum.uam.mx
Keywords: Mechanical View, Syntactic View, Semantic View, Metaphor, Analogy, Singular Causal Explanation, Causality, Realism, Nancy Cartwright, Carl Hempel, Rudolf Carnap, Bas Van Fraassen
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Fernando Morett
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2019 18:40
Last Modified: 22 May 2023 18:06
Item ID: 15901
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 19 January 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15901

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