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Computational neuroscience needs theoretical ethology: correcting an anthropomorphic bias

Gomez-Marin, Alex (2019) Computational neuroscience needs theoretical ethology: correcting an anthropomorphic bias. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette’s question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Gomez-Marin, Alex0000-0003-2764-2583
Keywords: Umwelt, coding, behavior, neuroscience, objectivity
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr. Alex Gomez-Marin
Date Deposited: 04 Apr 2019 01:54
Last Modified: 04 Apr 2019 01:54
Item ID: 15877
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Psychology > Comparative Psychology and Ethology
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 3 April 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15877

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