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Deception as Cooperation

Martínez, Manolo (2019) Deception as Cooperation. [Preprint]

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I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with `functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

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Item Type: Preprint
Martínez, Manolomail@manolomartinez.net0000-0002-6194-7121
Keywords: deception; rate-distortion; information; signaling games; Skyrms; Shannon
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Depositing User: Dr. Manolo Martínez
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2019 15:44
Last Modified: 25 Mar 2019 15:44
Item ID: 15845
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Date: 24 March 2019

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