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In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative

Park, Seungbae (2018) In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.

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Abstract

Sample (2015) argues that scientists ought not to believe that their theories are true because they cannot fulfill the epistemic obligation to take the diachronic perspective on their theories. I reply that Sample’s argument imposes an inordinately heavy epistemic obligation on scientists, and that it spells doom not only for scientific theories but also for observational beliefs and philosophical ideas that Samples endorses. I also delineate what I take to be a reasonable epistemic obligation for scientists. In sum, philosophers ought to impose on scientists only an epistemic standard that they are willing to impose on themselves.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Epistemic Obligation, Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, Scientific Individualism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2019 15:31
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 15:31
Item ID: 15638
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15638

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