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The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism

Park, Seungbae (2018) The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.

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Abstract

In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Anti-Induction, No-Miracles Argument, Pessimistic Induction, Scientific Realism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2019 15:29
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 15:29
Item ID: 15636
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15636

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