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Refutations of the Two Pessimistic Inductions

Park, Seungbae (2016) Refutations of the Two Pessimistic Inductions.

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Abstract

Both the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories and over scientists are built upon what I call proportional pessimism: as theories are discarded, the inductive rationale for concluding that the next theories will be discarded grows stronger. I argue that proportional pessimism clashes with the fact that present theories are more successful than past theories, and with the implications of the assumptions that there are finitely and infinitely many unconceived alternatives. Therefore, the two pessimistic inductions collapse along with proportional pessimism.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Pessimistic Induction, Proportional Pessimism, Unconceived Alternatives
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2019 15:06
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 15:06
Item ID: 15620
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15620

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