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Extensional Scientific Realism vs. Intensional Scientific Realism

Park, Seungbae (2016) Extensional Scientific Realism vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.

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Abstract

Extensional scientific realism is the view that each believable scientific theory is supported by the unique first-order evidence for it and that if we want to believe that it is true, we should rely on its unique first-order evidence. In contrast, intensional scientific realism is the view that all believable scientific theories have a common feature and that we should rely on it to determine whether a theory is believable or not. Fitzpatrick argues that extensional realism is immune, while intensional realism is not, to the pessimistic induction. I reply that if extensional realism overcomes the pessimistic induction at all, that is because it implicitly relies on the theoretical resource of intensional realism. I also argue that extensional realism, by nature, cannot embed a criterion for distinguishing between believable and unbelievable theories.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Park, Seungbae
Keywords: Intensional Realism, No-Miracles Argument, Extensional Realism, Pessimistic Induction, Scientific Realism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2019 15:02
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 15:02
Item ID: 15615
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15615

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