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Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori

Szabó, László E. (2019) Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori. [Preprint]

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Abstract

On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Szabó, László E.laszlo.e.szabo@gmail.com0000-0001-7454-8421
Keywords: Reichenbach, constitutive a priori, physicalism, formalism, meaning, truth, holism, intrinsic property
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Conventionalism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Prof. Laszlo E. Szabo
Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2019 18:04
Last Modified: 28 Apr 2019 18:04
Item ID: 15571
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Conventionalism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
Specific Sciences > Physics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: 8 January 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15571

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