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Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park

Dellsén, Finnur (2018) Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Dellsén (2017) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. Dellsén contrasts this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015) epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of Dellsén’s account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. Since a number of Park’s arguments rely on the idea that scientific progress may merely consists in “achieving the means to increase knowledge” (Park 2017: 570), I will start by discussing this “means-end thesis”.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dellsén, Finnurfinnurd@gmail.com0000-0003-4989-4204
Additional Information: Published in Journal for the General Philosophy of Science.
Keywords: scientific progress; understanding; knowledge; the noetic account
Subjects: General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Dr. Finnur Dellsén
Date Deposited: 02 Jan 2019 00:15
Last Modified: 02 Jan 2019 00:15
Item ID: 15532
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10838...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9419-y
Subjects: General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15532

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