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Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments

Islas, Damian (2017) Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Thought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cogni-tive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a “paradigmat-ic” thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown’s ra-tionalism and John D. Norton’s empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Islas, Damiandamian.islasmondragon@utoronto.ca0000-0001-8538-6835
Keywords: Thought experiments · Back ground knowledge · Confirmation · Plausibility · Success.
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: PhD. Damian Islas
Date Deposited: 18 Jul 2018 16:14
Last Modified: 18 Jul 2018 16:14
Item ID: 14862
Journal or Publication Title: Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science
Publisher: Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais
Official URL: https://www.historiographyofscience.org/index.php/...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2017.i3.06
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 2017
Page Range: pp. 68-76
Number: 3
ISSN: 2526-2270
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14862

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