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Putnam and contemporary fictionalism

Martínez-Vidal, Concha (2018) Putnam and contemporary fictionalism. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (2). pp. 165-181. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Putnam rejects having argued in the terms of the argument known in the literature as “the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument”. He considers that mathematics contribution to physics does not have to be interpreted in platonist terms but in his favorite modal variety (Putnam 1975; Putnam 2012). The purpose of this paper is to consider Putnam’s acknowledged argument and philosophical position against contemporary so called in the literature ‘fictionalist’ views about applied mathematics. The conclusion will be that the account of the applicability of mathematics that stems from Putnam‘s acknowledged argument can be assimilated to so-called ‘fictionalist’ views about applied mathematics.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Martínez-Vidal, Conchamconcepcion.martinez@usc.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Putnam, indispensability, fictionalism, Yablo, Field, ontology.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2018 17:58
Last Modified: 20 Jun 2018 17:58
Item ID: 14790
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17610
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Applicability
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date: May 2018
Page Range: pp. 165-181
Volume: 33
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14790

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