PhilSci Archive

The Argument from Surprise

Currie, Adrian (2017) The Argument from Surprise. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Argument from Surprise preprint.pdf

Download (334kB) | Preview

Abstract

I develop an account of productive surprise as an epistemic virtue of scientific investigations which does not turn on psychology alone. On my account, a scientific investigation is potentially productively surprising when (1) results can conflict with epistemic expectations, (2) those expectations pertain to a wide set of subjects. I argue that there are two sources of such surprise in science. One source, often identified with experiments, involves bringing our theoretical ideas in contact with new empirical observations. Another, often identified with simulations, involves articulating and bringing together different parts of our knowledge. Both experiments and simulations, then, can surprise.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Currie, Adrian
Keywords: Simulation; model; surprise; experiment
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Dr Adrian Currie
Date Deposited: 30 Apr 2018 00:42
Last Modified: 30 Apr 2018 00:42
Item ID: 14605
Official URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/004550...
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2017
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14605

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item