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Unfelt Pain

Reuter, Kevin and Sytsma, Justin (2018) Unfelt Pain. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The standard view in philosophy treats pains as phenomenally conscious mental states. This view has a number of corollaries, including that it is generally taken to rule out the existence of unfelt pains. The primary argument in support of the standard view is that it supposedly corresponds with the commonsense conception of pain. In this paper, we challenge this doctrine about the commonsense conception of pain, and with it the support offered for the standard view, by presenting the results of a series of new empirical studies that indicate that lay people not only tend to believe that unfelt pains are possible, but actually, quite common.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reuter, Kevin
Sytsma, Justin
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Synthese.
Keywords: pain; unfelt pain; experimental philosophy; conscious mental states; commonsense conception of pain
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2018 22:33
Last Modified: 07 Apr 2018 22:33
Item ID: 14548
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Date: 7 April 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14548

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