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Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics

González de Prado, Javier (2018) Still Unsuccessful: The Unsolved Problems of Success Semantics. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (1). pp. 5-22. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Success semantics is a theory of content that characterizes the truth-conditions of mental representations in terms of the success-conditions of the actions derived from them. Nanay (Philos Stud 165(1): 151-165, 2013) and Dokic and Engel (Frank Ramsey, London: Routledge, 2003) have revised this theory in order to defend it from the objections that assailed its previous incarnations. I argue that both proposals have seemingly decisive flaws. More specifically, these revised versions of the theory fail to deal adequately with the open-ended possibility of unforeseen obstacles for the success of our actions. I suggest that the problem of ignored obstacles undermines success semantics quite generally, including alternative formulations such as Blackburn’s.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
González de Prado, Javierjgonzalezdeprado@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: success semantics; naturalistic theories of content; mental representation; Frank Ramsey; teleosemantics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2018 21:21
Last Modified: 14 Mar 2018 21:21
Item ID: 14463
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17736
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Biology > Function/Teleology
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Date: January 2018
Page Range: pp. 5-22
Volume: 33
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14463

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