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The Variety-of-Evidence Thesis : A Bayesian Exploration of its Surprising Failures

Claveau, François and Grenier, Olivier (2017) The Variety-of-Evidence Thesis : A Bayesian Exploration of its Surprising Failures. [Preprint]


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Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength
of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb.

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Item Type: Preprint
Claveau, Franç
Keywords: evidence amalgamation; Bayesian epistemology; evidence variety; evidence independence; robustness; triangulation
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Mr. Olivier Grenier
Date Deposited: 03 Nov 2017 18:30
Last Modified: 03 Nov 2017 18:30
Item ID: 14086
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Date: October 2017

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