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Armchair Philosophy Naturalized

Lutz, Sebastian (2017) Armchair Philosophy Naturalized. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic-synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic-synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lutz, Sebastiansebastian.lutz@gmx.net0000-0003-4274-4174
Keywords: conceptual engineering; explication; methodological naturalism; Carnap sentence; Ramsey sentence; concept formation; theoretical terms; analytic-synthetic distinction
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Conventionalism
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Sebastian Lutz
Date Deposited: 25 Sep 2017 14:53
Last Modified: 25 Sep 2017 14:53
Item ID: 13486
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Conventionalism
General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2017
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13486

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