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How to think about informal proofs

Larvor, Brendan (2012) How to think about informal proofs. Synthese, 187 (2). pp. 715-730. ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

It is argued in this study that (i) progress in the philosophy of mathematical practice requires a general positive account of informal proof; (ii) the best candidate is to think of informal proofs as arguments that depend on their matter as well as their logical form; (iii) articulating the dependency of informal inferences on their content requires a redefinition of logic as the general study of inferential actions; (iv) it is a decisive advantage of this conception of logic that it accommodates the many mathematical proofs that include actions on objects other than propositions; (v) this conception of logic permits the articulation of project-sized tasks for the philosophy of mathematical practice, thereby supplying a partial characterisation of normal research in the field


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Larvor, Brendanb.p.larvor@herts.ac.uk0000-0003-0921-1659
Keywords: Mathematics; proof; derivation
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof
Depositing User: Dr Brendan Larvor
Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2017 18:19
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2017 18:19
Item ID: 13424
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Practice
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof
Date: 1 July 2012
Page Range: pp. 715-730
Volume: 187
Number: 2
ISSN: 0039-7857
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13424

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