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Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem

Rochefort-Maranda, Guillaume (2011) Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem. Erkenntnis. ISSN 0165-0106

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Abstract

In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Rochefort-Maranda, Guillaume
Keywords: constructive empiricism; closure problem; fictionalism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr. Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda
Date Deposited: 01 Sep 2017 14:33
Last Modified: 01 Sep 2017 14:33
Item ID: 13385
Journal or Publication Title: Erkenntnis
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9278-y
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 2011
ISSN: 0165-0106
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13385

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