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What Accuracy Could Not Be

Oddie, Graham (2016) What Accuracy Could Not Be. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Two different programs are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness program and the epistemic utility program. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. TL theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an inquiry even while falling short of the target. I show that the prospects for combining these two programs are bleak. A core accuracy principle, Proximity, that is universally embraced within the Truthlikeness program turns out to be incompatible with a central principle within the Epistemic Utility program, namely Propriety.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Oddie, Grahamoddie@colorado.edu0000-0002-9934-246X
Additional Information: This paper has been accepted for publication in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, but because of a publishing backlog will not appear online for several months.
Keywords: Accuracy, epistemic utility, truthlikeness, verisimilitude, propriety, proximity, Brier.
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User: Professor Graham Oddie
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2017 23:35
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2017 23:35
Item ID: 13105
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Values In Science
Date: 11 May 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13105

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