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Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism

Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhuja (2017) Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Stump (2007) argues for a virtue epistemological reading of Duhem's good sense: according to him Duhem advanced good sense as a source of justified beliefs about theory choice and as a mark of the cognitive character of the physicist. Ivanova (2010) argues that Duhem proposed good sense as a post hoc explanation of theory choice rather than as a justification of it. Fairweather (2011) has advanced a "hybrid position" combining Stump's and Ivanova's views. I contend that Ivanova’s reading of Duhem is inaccurate and that good sense can indeed be accommodated within virtue epistemology. However Stump’s account is incomplete: I propose that within virtue epistemology, agent reliabilism best accommodates Duhemian good sense. Moreover, no hybrid reading is required: I argue that agent reliabilism fully accommodates Duhem's position on good sense. Finally I also explore the relevance of a reliabilist reading of Duhem to the debate on how to deal with the Problem of Induction in scientific practice.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Bhakthavatsalam, Sindhujasbhakthav@csun.edu
Keywords: Duhem, Underdetermination, Good Sense, Virtue Epistemology, Theory Choice
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2017 18:47
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2017 18:47
Item ID: 12948
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.06.001
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 6 July 2017
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12948

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