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Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended

Teller, Paul (2016) Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Conventional scientific realism is just the doctrine that our theoretical terms refer. Conventional antirealism denies, for various reasons, theoretical reference and takes theory to give us only information about the word of the perceptual where reference, it would appear, is secure. But reference fails for the perceptual every bit as much for the perceptual as for the theoretical, and for the same reason: the world is too complicated for us to succeed in attaching specific referents to our terms. That would appear to leave us with a kind of latter day, representational idealism: All we have are representations. I argue that our representations tell us about an independent world without securing reference by showing that the world is very like the way it is represented in a range of different, often complementary modeling schemes. Though never exact, these representations are of something extra-representational because they present the world modally as going beyond what is represented explicitly.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Teller, Paul
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Paul Teller
Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2016 03:58
Last Modified: 21 Jun 2016 03:58
Item ID: 12211
Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 18 June 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12211

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