PhilSci Archive

The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist

Marcus, Russell (2015) The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30 (3). pp. 415-429. ISSN 2171-679X

[img]
Preview
Text
12009-56041-1-PB.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

Download (208kB) | Preview

Abstract

The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe. Indispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument against some contemporary eleatics attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and sketch a way to capture the important intuitions behind both views.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Marcus, Russellrmarcus1@hamilton.edu
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: indispensability argument; Eleatic principle; autonomy platonism; Mark Colyvan
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2016 19:37
Last Modified: 08 Jun 2016 19:37
Item ID: 12159
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.12009
Subjects: General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: September 2015
Page Range: pp. 415-429
Volume: 30
Number: 3
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12159

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item