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Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem

Altschul, Jon (2015) Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30 (2). pp. 251-269. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain. Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism. Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Altschul, Jonjlaltschul@gmail.com
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: perception; anti-Individualism; teleology; disjunction problem; twin earth
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 07 Jun 2016 13:07
Last Modified: 07 Jun 2016 13:07
Item ID: 12149
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.11008
Subjects: General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: May 2015
Page Range: pp. 251-269
Volume: 30
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12149

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