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Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation

Reutlinger, Alexander (2015) Is There A Monist Theory of Causal and Non-Causal Explanations? The Counterfactual Theory of Scientific Explanation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to develop a counterfactual theory of
explanation (for short, CTE). The CTE provides a monist framework for causal
and non-causal explanations, according to which both causal and non-causal
explanations are explanatory by virtue of revealing counterfactual dependencies
between the explanandum and the explanans. I argue that the CTE is applicable
to two paradigmatic examples of non-causal explanations: Euler’s explanation
and renormalization group explanations of universality.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Additional Information: Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Non-causal explanation, scientific explanation, causal explanation, mathematical explanation, renormalization group, counterfactuals
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 19 Oct 2016 22:52
Last Modified: 24 Oct 2016 17:39
Item ID: 11841
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
Specific Sciences > Mathematics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Date: 18 December 2015
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11841

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