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How Much Evidence Should One Collect?

Heesen, Remco (2015) How Much Evidence Should One Collect? Philosophical Studies, 172 (9). pp. 2299-2313.

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A number of philosophers of science and statisticians have attempted to justify conclusions drawn from a finite sequence of evidence by appealing to results about what happens if the length of that sequence tends to infinity. If their justifications are to be successful, they need to rely on the finite sequence being either indefinitely increasing or of a large size. These assumptions are often not met in practice. This paper analyzes a simple model of collecting evidence and finds that the practice of collecting only very small sets of evidence before taking a question to be settled is rationally justified. This shows that the appeal to long run results can be used neither to explain the success of actual scientific practice nor to give a rational reconstruction of that practice.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: Philosophy of science, Evidence, Rational choice, Formal epistemology, Bayesian epistemology, Sequential decision problems
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 17 Nov 2015 03:19
Last Modified: 13 Sep 2023 13:10
Item ID: 11155
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Studies
Publisher: Springer
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Experimentation
Date: 2015
Page Range: pp. 2299-2313
Volume: 172
Number: 9

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