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Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist be a Stanfordite?

Frost-Arnold, Greg (2014) Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist be a Stanfordite? In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Suppose one believes that the historical record of discarded scientific theories provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific critique of realism? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge, based on the problem of unconceived alternatives, cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism: (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Frost-Arnold, Greggfrost-arnold@hws.edu
Keywords: realism, anti-realism, pessimistic induction, problem of unconceived alternatives
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Greg Frost-Arnold
Date Deposited: 05 Nov 2014 21:14
Last Modified: 25 Dec 2015 14:21
Item ID: 11129
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 6 November 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11129

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