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Why Rigid Designation Cannot Stand on Scientific Ground

Curiel, Erik (2014) Why Rigid Designation Cannot Stand on Scientific Ground. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I do not think the notion of rigidity in designation can be correct, at least not in any way that can serve to ground a semantics purports both to be fundamental in a semiotical sense and to the best science of the day. A careful examination of both content and the character of our best scientific knowledge not cannot support anything like what the notion of rigidity requires, but actually shows the notion to be, at bottom, incoherent. In particular, the scientific meaning of natural kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of the ontology of natural kinds.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Curiel, Erikerik@strangebeautiful.com
Keywords: rigid designation scientific theories intra-theoretic relations natural kinds essentialism
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Dr. Erik Curiel
Date Deposited: 24 Aug 2014 16:08
Last Modified: 24 Aug 2014 16:08
Item ID: 10976
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Condensed Matter
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
General Issues > Structure of Theories
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10976

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