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What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?

Huber, Franz (2014) What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case? Journal of Philosophicl Logic.

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Abstract

The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in section 1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in section 2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in section 3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable absolute and relative frequencies, two empirical notions, are used to empirically test, or confirm, hypotheses about objective chances, a metaphysical notion, as a role-model. Specifically, I want to use this probabilistic account of the testing of chance hypotheses as a role-model for the account of the testing of counterfactuals, another metaphysical notion, that I will present in sections 4 to 8. I will conclude by comparing my proposal to one non-probabilistic and one probabilistic alternative in section 9.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Huber, Franzfranz.huber@utoronto.ca
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 14:15
Last Modified: 09 Jul 2014 14:15
Item ID: 10836
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Philosophicl Logic
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-01...
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10836

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