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Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive?

Mizrahi, Moti (2014) Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is ambiguous between two interpretations: CE as a normative epistemology of science and CE as a descriptive philosophy of science. When they present CE, constructive empiricists write as if CE is supposed to be more than a normative epistemology of science and that it is meant to be responsible to actual scientific practices. However, when they respond to objections, constructive empiricists fall back on a strictly normative interpretation of CE. This ambiguity seems to make CE immune to objections in a rather ad hoc fashion.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mizrahi, Motimotimizra@gmail.com
Additional Information: Forthcoming in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
Keywords: Bas van Fraassen; constructive empiricism; inference to the best explanation; observable; scientific realism; voluntarist epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited: 08 Mar 2014 13:36
Last Modified: 08 Mar 2014 13:36
Item ID: 10554
Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 7 March 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10554

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