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Logic, the A Priori, and the Empirical

Hanson, William H (2003) Logic, the A Priori, and the Empirical. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 18 (2). pp. 171-177. ISSN 2171-679X

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The time-honored view that logic is a non-empirical enterprise is still widely accepted, but it is not always
recognized that there are (at least) two distinct ways in which this view can be made precise. One way focuses
on the knowledge we can have of logical matters, the other on the nature of the logical consequence relation itself. More specifically, the first way embodies the claim that knowledge of whether the logical consequence relation holds in a particular case is knowledge that can be had a priori (if at all). The second way presupposes a distinction between structural and non-structural properties and relations, and it holds that logical consequence is to be defined exclusively in terms of the former. It is shown that the two ways are not coextensive by giving an example of a logic that is non-empirical in the second way but not in the

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Hanson, William
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: logic, a priori, structure, logical consequence
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 20:15
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 21:06
Item ID: 10528
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Date: 2003
Page Range: pp. 171-177
Volume: 18
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X

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