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Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations

Corbí, Josep (2004) Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19 (2). pp. 155-172. ISSN 2171-679X

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Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: normativity, moral subjectivism, projectivism, dispositionalism, moral realism, explanation, morality
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 18:07
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 18:07
Item ID: 10503
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Date: May 2004
Page Range: pp. 155-172
Volume: 19
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X

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