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Truthmaking and Supervenience

Pagès, Joan (2005) Truthmaking and Supervenience. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 20 (2). pp. 191-197. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In his criticism of Armstrong’s argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker essentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong’s argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons’ notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong supervenience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong’s truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Pagès, Joanjoan.pages@udg.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Metaphysics, truth, truthmakers, supervenience
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 17:47
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 17:47
Item ID: 10485
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.572
Date: May 2005
Page Range: pp. 191-197
Volume: 20
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10485

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