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Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note

Robles, Gemma and Méndez, José M (2005) Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 20 (2). pp. 183-190. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing special constraints on F. Relational ternary semantics are provided.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Robles, Gemmagemm@usal.es
Méndez, José Msefus@usal
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: Intuitionistic logic, Contraction Axiom, Converse Ackermann Property, Constructive Falsity
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 17:42
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 17:42
Item ID: 10484
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.571
Date: May 2005
Page Range: pp. 183-190
Volume: 20
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10484

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