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The Relevance of History to Philosophy of Science

Hudson, Robert G. (2006) The Relevance of History to Philosophy of Science. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (2). pp. 197-212. ISSN 2171-679X

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My task in this paper is to defend the legitimacy of historicist philosophy of science, defined as the philosophic study of science that takes seriously case studies drawn from the practice of science. Historicist philosophy of science suffers from what I call the ‘evidence problem’. The worry is that case studies cannot qualify as rigorous evidence for the adjudication of philosophic theories. I explore the reasons why one might deny to historical cases a probative value, then reply to these reasons on behalf of historicism. The main proponents of the view I am criticizing are Pitt (2001) and Rasmussen (2001).

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Hudson, Robert
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: historicized philosophy of science, induction, reflexivity, flux, methodology, evidence, Joseph Pitt, Nicolas Rasmussen
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 11 Mar 2014 15:24
Last Modified: 11 Mar 2014 21:51
Item ID: 10457
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle:
Date: 2006
Page Range: pp. 197-212
Volume: 21
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X

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