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Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception

Fernández Prat, Olga (2006) Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 21 (2). pp. 133-145. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in diverse ways) is not. This paper reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after mentioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may be regarded as a compromise between the contenders.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Fernández Prat, Olgaolga.fernandez@uab.es
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: intentionality, perceptual content, perceptual attention
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2014 20:30
Last Modified: 06 Mar 2014 20:30
Item ID: 10453
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.533
Date: May 2006
Page Range: pp. 133-145
Volume: 21
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10453

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